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DEFENSE ATTORNEYS AS GOVERNMENT 
INFORMANTS: STRANGERS IN A STRANGE 
LAND? 
INTRODUCTION 
If the Government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt 
for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; 
it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of 
the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that 
the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the 
conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retri-
bution.1 
As described by one commentator, United States v. Ofshe2 is 
truly a "story without heroes."3 Ronald Of she was arrested in 
December 1982 on charges of possession with intent to distribute 
cocaine.4 At that time he retained the services of local Florida 
counsel, Melvin Black.5 In February 1983 he also retained the 
services of out-of-state counsel, Marvin Glass.6 Glass, a Chicago 
attorney, was retained to assume "a lead counsel position with 
respect to communications with the prosecution and plea 
negotiations. "7 
Shortly after his representation of Of she commenced, Glass 
was informed by the United States Attorney's Office that Glass 
himself was the target of a criminal investigation.s In response, 
Glass offered his services in "identifying and investigating 
1. Olmstead v. United States. 277 U.S. 438. 485 (1928) (Brandeis. J .• dissenting). 
2. 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1987). 
3. Berg. Shallow Ruling Trespasses on Client Confidentiality. Fulton Co. Daily Rep .• 
Sept. 2. 1987. at 2. col. 1. 
4. United States v. Of she. 817 F.2d at 1510. 
5. !d. 
6. Petition for Certiorari at 4, United States v. Of she, 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir.) (No. 
87-407), cert. denied. 108 S. Ct. 451 (1987). 
7.Id. 
8. Of sIte. 817 F.2d at 1511. Glass' criminal indictment resulted from Operation Grey-
lord. "a three and one-half year undercover investigation of corruption in the Cook County 
court system conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. United States Attorney 
for the Northern District of Illinois, and the Cook County State's Attorney." Note. The 
Greylord Im.:estigation Guidelines: Protection for Greylord Attorneys? 16 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 
641. 641 n.l (1985). 
619 
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suspected drug traffickers" to Assistant U.S. Attorney Scott 
Turow of the U.S. Attorney's Office in Chicago, Illinois.9 By June 
1983 Glass even had suggested his client, Of she, as a possible 
target for the investigation.lO To this end, Turow "sought and 
received permission to place a Nagra body bug on Glass and to 
conduct an electronic surveillance of the conversations between 
Glass and his client."ll 
Glass continued to represent Of she in this manner for ten more 
months with the knowledge of Turow, the U.S Attorney for the 
Southern District of Florida, and the presiding trial judge.I2 
Ultimately, Of she's motions to suppress the evidence13 and to 
dismiss the indictmentI4 were denied. He was convicted of 
possession with intent to distribute cocaine and sentenced to four 
years in the penitentiary. 15 
While expressing grave constitutional concerns, the Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Of she's conviction.I6 
The court held that Glass' ineffective representation of Of she did 
not prejudice the defendant; that the government intrusion in 
9. O/sM, 817 F.2d at 1511. 
10. [d. 
11. !d. A Nagra body bug is a surveillance device which is placed on an individual to 
monitor conversations and provide a taped recording of the conversations. See Petition 
for Certiorari, supra note 6, at 4-5. 
12. O/sM, 817 F.2d at 1511. Upon learning of Glass' conflict in February of 1984, the 
trial judge ordered the U.S. Attorney to notify Of she that Glass was acting as a 
government informant against him. However, Glass' appeal of the judge's order resulted 
in keeping the court file on this matter sealed until February of 1985. [d. 
13. Of she filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained by the government, claiming 
that his fourth amendment rights were violated because the warrant was issued by and 
directed to be executed by the same individual. Furthermore, Of she contended that the 
warrant contained insufficient information regarding the reliability of the government 
informant and the description of the premises to be searched. [d. at 1513-14. According 
to the appellate court, the district court properly rejected Of she's fourth amendment 
claim because "[t]he errors assailed were those of form, not of substance." [d. at 1514. 
See also Seventeenth Annual Review 0/ Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court 
and Courts 0/ Appeals 1986-1987, 76 GEO. L.J. 521, 549 n.151 (1988), citing O/she for the 
proposition that a "warrant naming only one business in multiple use commercial building 
[was] valid when officers had no reason to know premises subdivided into separate 
offices." [d. 
14. Of she's motions to dismiss for violations of due process and the right to counsel 
were filed on July 15, 1985. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 6, at 3. The motion was 
filed following attorney Black's receipt of a letter from Chief Assistant U.S. Attorney 
Joseph McSorley, on February 16, 1985, informing him that Glass was a government 
informant who had taped a conversation with Of she while acting as his counsel. Of she, 
817 F.2d at 1512. 
15. See Berg, supra note 3, at 2, col. 1. 
16. O/sM, 817 F.2d at 1517. 
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this case did not prejudice Of she; and that there was no conflict 
of interest which worked to Of she's prejudiceP 
Of she's basic contention on appeal was that the government's 
use of his attorney as an informant against him warranted a 
reversal of his conviction because such action violates both the 
sixth amendment right to counsel and the fifth amendment right 
to due process.1S Of she's sixth amendment claim challenged the 
constitutionality of government intrusion into the attorney-client 
relationship, asserting that such intrusion resulted in both 
ineffective representation and a conflict of interest.19 Of she's fifth 
amendment claim focused on the questionable methods employed 
by the government to obtain information concerning Of she's 
activities.20 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit examined and 
summarily disposed of Of she's fifth and sixth amendment claims 
with little more than cursory analysis. This Comment briefly 
discusses the fifth amendment issue raised, but primarily focuses 
on the potential implications of the court of appeals' analysis of 
the sixth amendment's guarantee of right to counsel. In re-
examining these claims, it is interesting to note the juxtaposition 
of the court's recognition of the egregious facts of this case21 
with its decision that Ofshe suffered no harm from either his 
defense counsel's or the government's activities. 
1. SIXTH AMENDMENT ISSUES 
The sixth amendment provides in part that "[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall ... have the assistance of counsel 
for his defense."22 The United States Supreme Court has long 
held that this constitutional right to counsel is the right to 
"effective assistance of competent counsel."23 To this end, the 
17. ld. at 1516. 
18. ld. at 1515-16. 
19. ld. at 1515. 
20. ld. at 1516. 
21. The court acknowledged its belief "that Glass' and Turow's conduct was repre-
hensible." ld. at 1516 n.6. 
22. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
23. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). See also Reece v. Georgia, 350 
U.S. 85, 90 (1955) (denial of counsel before grand jury indictment violated constitutional 
requisite of due process which states must recognize}, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 
60, 70 (1942) (" 'assistance of counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment contemplates 
that such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired"); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 
446 (1940) (right of criminal defendant to assistance of counsel includes not only formal 
3
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(k) providing suitable programmes keeping in view the 
special needs of the minorities and tribal communities; 
(1) taking special steps to protect the interests of children, 
the blind, the aged, the handicapped and other vulnerable 
Sections of the people; 
(m) promoting national integration by broadcasting in a 
manner that facilitates communication in the languages in 
India; and facilitating the distribution of regional broad-
casting services in every State in the languages of that 
State; 
(n) providing comprehensive broadcast coverage through 
the choice of appropriate technology and the best utilisa-
tion of the broadcast frequencies available and ensuring 
high quality reception; 
(0) promoting research and development activities in or-
der to ensure that radio and television broadcast technol-
ogy are constantly updated; and 
(P) expanding broadcasting facilities by establishing addi-
tional channels of transmission at various levels. 
(3) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of 
the foregoing provisions, the Corporation may take such steps as it 
thinks fit-
(a) to ensure that broadcasting is conducted as a public 
service to provide and produce programmes; 
(b) to establish a system for the gathering of news for ra-
dio and television; 
(c) to negotiate for purchase of, or otherwise acquire, 
programmes and rights or privileges in respect of sports 
and other events, films, serials, occasions, meetings, func-
tions or incidents of public interest, for broadcasting and 
to establish procedures for the allocation of such program-
mes, rights or privileges to the services; 
(d) to establish and maintain a library or libraries of ra-
dio, television and other materials; 
(e) to conduct or commission, from time to time, 
programmes, audience research, market or technical ser-
vice, which may be released to such persons and in such 
4
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manner and subject to such terms and conditions as the 
Corporation may think fit; 
if) to provide such other services as may be specified by 
regulations. 
(4) Nothing in sub-sections (2) and (3) shall prevent the Cor': 
poration from managing on behalf of the Central Government and 
in accordance with such terms and conditions as may be specified 
by that Government the broadcasting of External Services and 
monitoring of broadcasts made by organisations outside India on 
the basis of arrangements made for reimbursement of expenses by 
the Central Government. 
(5) For the purposes of ensuring that adequate time is made 
available for the promotion of the objectives set out in this Section, 
the Central Government shall have the power to determine the 
maximum limit of broadcast time in respect of the advertisement. 
(6) The Corporation shall be subject to no civil liability on the 
ground merely that it failed to comply with any of the provisions of 
this Section. 
(7) The Corporation shall have power to determine and levy 
fees and other service charges for or in respect of the advertise-
ments and such programmes as may be specified by regulations: 
Provided that the fees and other service charges levied and 
collected under this sub-section shall not exceed such limits as may 
be determined by the Central Government, from time to time. 
13. Parliamentary Committee.-(1) There shall be consti-
tuted a Committee consisting of twenty-two Members of Parlia-
ment, of whom fifteen from the House of the People to be elected 
by the Members thereof and seven from the Council of States to be 
elected by the Members thereof in accordance with the system of 
proportional representation by means of the single transferable 
vote, to oversee that the Corporation discharges its functions in 
accordance with the provisions of this Act and, in particular, the 
objectives set out in Section 12 and submit a report thereon to 
Parliament. 
(2) The Committee shall function in accordance with such 
rules as may be made by the Speaker of the House of the People. 
14. EStablishment of Broadcasting Council, term of office 
and removal, etc., of members thereof.-(1) There shall be estab-
5
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substantial disadvantage to the course of his defense.' "36 The 
stricter Supreme Court standard of prejudice entails "a general 
requirement that the defendant affirmatively prove prejudice."37 
This requirement of proof of actual prejudice has led at least one 
commentator to conclude that the standard is too stringent to 
provide relief for criminal defendants raising general 
ineffectiveness of counsel claims.38 
Even when courts acknowledge blatant deficiencies on the part 
of an attorney, they have been hesitant in concluding that such 
deficiencies prejudiced a defendant.39 Thus, success on the first 
prong of the test does not satisfy the complete standard. 
Prejudice within the context of an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim has not been clearly defined by the Court. Although 
the Court has established prejudice as an element of the test, it 
has deliberately failed to specify what constitutes prejudice.40 
According to the Strickland Court, a "defendant must show that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different."41 
Curiously, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals did not apply 
the Supreme Court's Strickland test in its analysis of Of she's 
claims. Although the court clearly conceded that Glass' 
representation of Of she was deficient,42 it held, without further 
elaboration, that Of she did not suffer prejudice.43 
36. Id. at 682 (quoting Washington v. Strickland. 693 F.2d 1243. 1262 (5th Cir. 1982)). 
37. Id. at 693. 
38. For a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the Strickland test. see Note. 
Ineffective Assistance of CQUnsel Claims: Toward a Uniform Framework For Review: 
Strickland v. Washington. 50 Mo. L. REV. 651 (1986). 
39. See. e.g .• United States v. Mouzin. 785 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1986) (disbarment of 
defendant's attorney not enough to establish that counsel's assistance to defendant was 
ineffectivel. But see United States v. Cancilla. 725 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1984) (defendant's 
trial counsel held ineffective when. unbeknownst to defendant. counsel engaged in similar 
type of criminal activity for which defendant was being tried); Solina v. United States. 
709 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1983) (failure of defendant's attorney to pass any state bar denied 
defendant the effective assistance of counsel). 
40. Strickland. 466 U.S. at 688 ("More specific guidelines are not appropriate:·). 
41. Id. at 694. 
42. United States v. Ofshe. 817 F.2d 1508. 1516 (11th Cir. 1987). The court noted that 
"the government allowed the ineffective representation to continue for over 10 months:' 
Id. at 1511. See also Appellee's Motion to Amend Panel Opinion at 10. United States v. 
Of she. 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1987) (No. 86-5351). ("In this case. the foreseeable result of 
Turow's conduct was that Glass' representation of Of she would be rendered ineffective:')' 
43. Of she. 817 F.2d at 1515. "We reiterate and emphasize that Of she suffered no 
prejudice as a result of the taped conversation." Id. The court's failure to develop its 
reasoning leaves unanswered a crucial question: how could such blatantly ineffective 
6
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Because Of she was not examined under the Strickland guidelines, 
one avenue of challenging a sixth amendment violation was 
automatically closed to Of she. The court of appeals could have 
analyzed this issue, regardless of whether the Strickland standard 
had been raised by Of she at the trial level, because the facts 
established that such ineffective representation on Glass' part 
was apparent.44 The court of appeals readily determined that the 
first prong of the Strickland test was met; there was an 
acknowledged ineffective representation.45 If the court had applied 
Strickland, it should have determined whether the ineffective 
representation by Glass prejudiced Of she's defense such that the 
result rendered was unreliable. The failure of the Eleventh Circuit 
to apply Strickland in a case peculiarly suited to its application 
is noteworthy in light of the importance the Supreme Court has 
placed on the right to effective representation.46 
B. Government Intrusion into the Attorney-Client Relationship 
A second aspect of the sixth amendment guarantee to effective 
assistance of counsel is implicated when governmental agents, 
including informers, impermissibly intrude into the attorney-
client relationship.47 The Supreme Court addressed this issue in 
United States v. Morrison.48 Defendant Hazel Morrison, indicted 
on federal drug charges, retained private counsel. Although 
government agents were aware that Morrison was represented 
by counsel, they met with her twice without her attorney's 
knowledge or permission and urged her to cooperate with the 
government in making its case.49 After refusing to cooperate, 
Morrison moved to have her indictment dismissed claiming the 
governmental intrusion had violated her sixth amendment right 
to counsel. The district court denied her motion and the Court 
representation not constitute prejudice to Of she's defense? The opinion does not address 
this question because the court of appeals never applied the standards or reasoning of 
Strickland to Of she's case. No reference to Strickfllnd appears within the court's opinion. 
44. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.s. 261 (1981). Justice Powell, writing for the majority, 
noted that failure to raise a constitutional issue in the lower cocrt does not preclude the 
Court from addressing such an issue "in the interests of justice," when such constitutional 
violation is apparent from the record. ld. at 265 n.5. 
45. Of she, 817 F.2d at 1511. The words "ineffective representation" appear only in the 
court's initial reference to Glass' poor representation. ld. 
46. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
47. See cases cited supra note 25. 
48. 449 U.S. 361 (1981). 
49. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. at 362. 
7
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of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed.5O The Supreme Court 
accepted certiorari and articulated the standard for sixth 
amendment claims arising out of governmental intrusion into the 
attorney-client relationship. 
The Court in Morrison established a fairly stringent two-prong 
test for dismissal of an indictment when government agents 
violate a defendant's sixth amendment right to effective assistance 
of counsel. A defendant must first establish that actions on the 
part of the government violated the sixth amendment. 51 Secondly, 
the defendant must demonstrate that the violation led to actual 
prejudice resulting in an "adverse . . . impact on the criminal 
proceedings."52 The practical effect of the Morrison test is that 
government intrusion alone into an attorney-client relationship 
will not result in automatic dismissal of an indictment absent a 
showing of "demonstrable prejudice" to the defendant.53 The 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit espoused this view in 
Of she. 
Although courts have found government activity which was 
intrusive enough to constitute reversal of a conviction or 
indictment,54 the trend has been to uphold a defendant's conviction 
even if a sixth amendment violation by the government has been 
established.55 Thus, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is 
50. fd. at 363. 
51. fd. at 365. 
52. fd. 
53. fd. See also Seventeenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States 
Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1986-1987, 76 GEO. L.J. 921, 945 n.2092 (1988), 
referencing the O/she case in support of the Morrison theory that government intrusion alone, 
in the absence of proven prejudice, will not warrant dismissal of an indictment. 
54. See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 231 (1977) ("[p]etitioner's Sixth Amendment 
rights were violated by a corporeal identification conducted after the initiation of adver-
sary judicial criminal proceedings and in the absence of counsel."); Geders v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976) (The trial court's "order preventing petitioner from consulting 
his counsel 'about anything' during a 17-hour overnight recess ..• inIpinged upon his 
right to the assistance of counsel .... "); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 858 (1975) 
(New York statute allowing trial judge to deny defense counsel the right to summation 
at close of trial held unconstitutional violation of a criminal defendant's right to counsell; 
United States v. Valencia, 541 F.2d 618, 622 (6th Cir. 1976) (government's action in 
employing undercover informant acting as secretary to attorney for defendant in drug 
prosecution case mandated reversal of conviction and new triall. 
55. See, e.g., Morrison, 449 U.S. at 361 (government agents meeting with defendant 
without knowledge or permission of her attorney violated her sixth amendment rights 
but did not justify dismissal of indictment absent showing of prejudice to counsel's ability 
to represent defendant); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) (participation in 
pretrial meetings between accused, accused's attorney, and undercover agent did not 
unconstitutionally infringe accused's right to effective assistance of counsel even when 
8
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immediately disadvantaged if the only sixth amendment challenge 
is tied solely to government action in the case.56 Interestingly, 
the court of appeals based most of its sixth amendment analysis 
upon this claim.57 This narrow focus led the court to conclude 
that the facts of Ojshe, limited to government action alone, did 
not demonstrate the requisite prejudice resulting from the 
government's actions and, thus, could not sustain a sixth 
amendment challenge based on this singular claim.58 
Under Morrison and related cases, it is not surprising that the 
Ojshe court found the government's actions to be borderline 
constitutional.59 Some courts have subjected government intrusion 
claims to very strict standards,60 deferring to the government's 
legitimate interest in acting to deter crime and apprehend 
criminals.61 
undercover agent later testified on behalf of the prosecution); United States v. Melvin, 
650 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (codefendant turned informant did not merit dismissal 
of defendant's case if some other remedy could be fashioned to vindicate defendant's 
right to counsell; United States v. King, 536 F. Supp. 253 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (effective 
assistance of counsel did not guarantee confidentiality regarding attorney's criminal 
activity on behalf of client). 
56. When government conduct leads to violation of the sixth amendment right to 
counsel the usual remedy is not dismissal, but rather suppression of evidence so obtained. 
See Morrison, 449 U.S. at 365. IT any evidence illegally obtained is not introduced at trial, 
as in the O/she case, a government intrusion claim alone is an empty sixth amendment 
challenge. 
57. The court of appeals cited five cases in its analysis of Of she's sixth amendment 
claim. Four of these were "government intrusion" cases: Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981) 
(prejudice required to effect dismissal of indictment in government intrusion case); 
Weatherford, 429 U.S. 547 (1977) (government intrusion results in sixth amendment 
violation only if information obtained is communicated to prosecution); Melvin, 650 F.2d 
641 (5th Cir. 1981) (absent showing of prejudice, government informant's presence at 
strategy meetings between defendant and counsel does not constitute sixth amendment 
violation); United States v. Sander, 615 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 835 
(1980) (no sixth amendment violation when police examine file of defendant's murdered 
attorney and no information contained therein is utilized by prosecution). O/she, 817 F.2d 
at 1515. 
58. O/she, 817 F.2d at 1515. 
59. However, the court still categorized the government's actions through Assistant 
U.S. Attorney Turow as "reprehensible." ld. at 1516 n.6. 
60. See, e.g., United States v. King, 536 F. Supp. 253, 258-61 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (district 
court formulated a three·prong test to determine whether a government intrusion has, 
in fact, undermined a legitimate attorney-client relationship). 
61. Morrison, 449 U.S. at 364 ("[W]e have implicitly recognized the necessity for 
preserving society's interest in the administration of criminal justice."). Arguably, gov· 
ernment action to deter crime and apprehend criminals would be ineffective if the 
government were so hamstrung by judicial rules that the government could never intrude 
upon the attorney-client relationship, even through constitutionally permissible means. 
9
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Had the facts of Of she implicated only the government's activity, 
the court of appeals' analysis under Morrison would be more 
convincing. However, the flaw in this narrow approach is that 
the court's analysis does not address the constitutional concerns 
associated with a sixth amendment violation resulting from the 
actions of the government concurrent with the actions of the 
defendant's attorney. 
By focusing primarily on the government's conduct, the Of she 
court narrowed the sixth amendment question to the single issue 
of whether the government's action in taping attorney Glass' 
conversation with his client constituted prejudice to Ofshe.62 The 
court of appeals noted that the government did not provide 
evidence procured from this tape to the prosecutor in Of she's 
case.63 Thus, the court's logical conclusion, premised solely on 
Morrison, was that Of she was not prejudiced by the government's 
action. 
It is unclear why the Eleventh Circuit concentrated its analysis 
solely upon whether the government's action was such that 
evidence should be excluded. The court's limited analysis 
foreclosed consideration of the broader and more relevant issue 
raised by the facts of Of she. The controlling issue is not one of 
tainted evidence due to government intrusion into the attorney-
client relationship.64 Rather, more subtle and grave constitutional 
concerns are generated when the government acts in concert 
with the criminal defense attorney to the detriment of the 
defendant's representation. The court's primary focus on the 
government's activity in a vacuum, rather than on the compelling 
constitutional implications of the combined activity of Glass and 
the government, circumvented any complete and thorough analysis 
of Of she's sixth amendment challenge. 
C. Attorney Conflict of Interest 
A third aspect of the sixth amendment right to counsel is 
analogous to the maxim that "no man may serve two masters."65 
A legal corollary to this maxim is that no attorney can effectively 
62. Oishe. 817 F.2d at 1515. 
63.Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Matthew 6:24. 
10
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serve competing interests.66 The validity of sixth amendment 
attorney conflict of interest claims is judged by the Supreme 
Court's standard enunciated in Cuyler v. Sullivan.67 
In Cuyler, John Sullivan and two co-defendants were represented 
by two privately retained attorneys in separate murder trials.68 
Sullivan was tried first. At the close of the state's case, the 
defense rested without presentation of any evidence. Consequently, 
Sullivan was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment based 
on circumstantial evidence.69 The Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit granted Sullivan's habeas corpus petition, holding that 
the joint representation by Sullivan's defense counsel evidenced 
"a possible conflict of interest."7o 
Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, stating that a 
possible conflict does not establish a sixth alllendment violation.71 
The Cuyler standard mandates an actual conflict of interest 
resulting in the attorney's adverse performance.72 Significantly, 
the Court also emphasized that "a defendant who shows that a 
conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his 
representation, need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain 
relief."73 
There has been some disagreement among lower courts as to 
whether the Cuyler test is satisfied once an actual conflict of 
interest has been established or whether the test requires 
additional proof establishing that the conflict resulted in an 
inability of the attorney to effectively represent his client.74 One 
important factor distinguishing the Cuyler standard from that of 
Morrison and Strickland is clear, however. The Cuyler test does 
66. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). The Court held that "requiring an 
attorney to represent two codefendants whose interests were in conflict [denies] one of 
the defendants his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel." ld. at 
481. 
67. 446 U.S. 335 (1980). 
68. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 337. 
69. !d. at 338. 
70. !d. at 340. 
71. ld. at 348. 
72.ld. 
73. ld. at 349-50 (emphasis added). 
74. Compare Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391, 397 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) ("[T]he standard 
imposed by the Supreme Court in Cuyler is met by proof of an actual conflict of interest.") 
with Parker v. Parratt, 662 F.2d 479, 483-84 (8th Cir. 1981) (The Cuyler standard 
mandates evidence of both an actual conflict of interest and adverse effect.). 
For a thorough discussion of the varying interpretations by the lower courts of the 
Cayit r standard, see Note, Conflicts of Interest in the RepresentatWn of Multiple Criminal 
Defend(mts: ClarUying Cuyler v. Sullivan, 70 GEO. L.J. 1527 (1982). 
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not require the defendant to further bear the burden of proving 
how this conflict actually prejudiced him. The prejudice is 
presumed.75 The Strickland Court, in distinguishing ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims from conflict of interest claims, 
articulated the necessity for presuming prejudice in the latter: 
[When an attorney is burdened by an actual conflict of inter-
est,] counsel breaches the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most 
basic of counsel's duties. Moreover, it is difficult to measure 
the precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted 
by conflicting interests. Given the obligation of counsel to 
avoid conflicts of interest and the ability of trial courts to 
make early inquiry in certain situations likely to give rise to 
conflicts . . . it is reasonable for the criminal justice system 
to maintain a fairly rigid rule of presumed prejudice for 
conflicts of interest.76 
It would have been more appropriate for the court of appeals 
to base the Ojshe opinion upon the Cuyler premise that an actual 
conflict of interest results in presumed prejudice.77 Glass' actions 
were designed to mitigate his own pending criminal culpability 
and arguably created such a gross distortion between the concepts 
of loyalty to the client and loyalty to one's own best interests 
that an inherent conflict of interest arose at the inception of the 
"deal" struck between Glass and Turow.78 This conflict constituted 
a continuing and blatant violation of Of she's fundamental sixth 
amendment rights that could not be remedied once it occurred. 
Inexplicably, the Ojshe court devoted scant attention to the 
conflict of interest issue in its opinion and did no more than 
75. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349. 
76. Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.s. 668, 692 (1984). Other courts have also empha· 
sized the constitutional status of an attorney's loyalty to his client. See, e.g., United States 
v. Alvarez, 580 F.2d 1251, 1254 (5th Cir. 1978) ("Undivided loyalty and fidelity of 
commitment is therefore the guiding principle in this important area of Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence."). 
77. The conflict of interest aspect of a sixth amendment claim is perhaps the least 
tested with respect to the peculiar facts of OjsM. Most cases have dealt with issues of 
multiple or joint representation of defendants. See, e.g., Cuyler, 446 U.S. 335 (multiple 
representation issue implicated when two privately retained attorneys represented three 
criminal co-defendants jointly); Alvarez, 580 F.2d 1251 (attorney's multiple representation 
of defendant and two co-defendants who turned government witnesses at trial created 
actual conflict of interest); lllinois v. Washington, 101 m. 2d 104, 461 N.E.2d 393 (1984) 
(application of Cuyler actual conflict of interest standard restricted to multiple represen-
tation cases). 
78. OjsM, 817 F.2d at 1511. Ironically, Glass' egregious methods appear to have served 
him little. He was convicted of the criminal charges he had tried to mitigate and was 
sentenced to eight years in prison. Berg, supra note 3, at 2, col. 3. 
12
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tacitly acknowledge that Glass did indeed have a significant 
conflict of interest.79 The court did not consider whether this, 
the strongest of Ofshe's claims, merited a presumption of prejudice 
and a subsequent dismissal of his conviction, nor did the court 
refer to the Cuyler case or its historical predecessors.80 
The government's action in aiding and encouraging a criminal 
defense attorney to betray his loyalty to his client concurrent 
with that attorney's acquiescence jeopardizes the criminal 
defendant's constitutional guarantee of effective counsel.S1 This 
issue is especially significant in Of she because the court declined 
to address what could be a paradigm example of an actual conflict 
of interest. This failure by the court raises grave constitutional 
concerns for potential judicial erosion of the attorney-client 
relationship. &2 
79. O/she. 817 F.2d at 1516. 
80. Predecessors of Cuyler include Holloway v. Arkansas. 435 U.S. 475 (1978) and 
Glasser v. United States. 315 U.S. 60 (1942). One could argue that the standards of Cuyler 
do not apply to O/she as Cuyler and its predecessors addressed the conflict of interest 
issue in multiple representation cases. However. a significant number of courts addressing 
a variety of conflict of interest issues have applied the Cuyler standard outside the genre 
of multiple representation cases. See. e.g .• Wood v. Georgia. 450 U.S. 261 (1981) (conflict 
exists when attorney representing defendant employees was retained and paid by em-
ployer whose interests conflicted with those of his employees); United States v. Cancilla. 
725 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1984) (conflict of interest arose when defense counsel was implicated 
in criminal activity similar to that for which his client was being tried); Solina v. United 
States. 709 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1983) (inherent conflict of interest found when defense 
counsel failed to inform defendant that counsel had never passed a required state bar 
examination); United States v. Knight. 680 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1982) (defense counsel 
implicated in theft of documents during defendant's trial); United States v. Hearst. 638 
F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980) (conflict claim centered on allegation that defense counsel 
pursued his own interest in publication rights rather than defendant's interest in acquittal). 
Further. as recently as 1984. Justice Rehnquist. in a strongly worded dissent to a 
denial of certiorari. argued that the Dlinois Supreme Court erred in interpreting Cuyler 
as applying only to those cases involving multiple representation of defendants and stated 
that. as evidenced by lower court decisions. proper application of Cuyler was not so 
limited. See TIlinois v. Washington. 101 TIl. 2d 104. 461 N.E.2d 393. cert. denied. 469 U.S. 
1022 (1984) (Rehnquist. J •• dissenting). Justice Rehnquist argued that the proper standard 
to apply in conflict of interest cases was an issue which should be addressed by the 
Supreme Court. !d. at 1022. In this context. it is interesting to note that a writ of 
certiorari for Ofthe was denied on November 30. 1987. Of she v. United States. 108 S. Ct. 
451 (1987). 
81. See Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668. 688 (1984). ("Counsel's function is to 
assist the defendant. and hence counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty. a duty to avoid 
conflicts of interest."). 
82. Commentators have noted the emergence of a judicial trend allowing intrusions 
upon the historically safeguarded attorney-client relationship. See. e.g .• Falsgraf. A Dan-
gerous Wedge Between Lawyer and Client. 72 A.B.A. J. 8 (1986) (discussing the increase 
of grand jury subpoenas to criminal defense attorneys!; Merkle & Moscarino. Are Prose-
13
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Application of the Cuyler standard to the facts of Ojshe may 
have resulted in the court's reconsideration of its conclusion that 
"Of she suffered no prejudice."83 Cuyler's premise is that no 
demonstration of prejudice is required once the "mixed question 
of law and fact"84 establishes that an actual conflict of interest 
has adversely affected an attorney's ability to represent his client 
loyally and zealously. The court should have followed this analysis 
to determine whether the concerted actions of attorney Glass 
and the government affected Of she's sixth amendment rights. 
Concededly, because of the insidious nature of the combined 
actions of Glass and the government, it would be nearly impossible 
to pinpoint any concrete action which actually prejudiced Ofshe.85 
Under the rationale of Cuyler, however, it is not necessary to do 
SO.86 
Although the claims of attorney conflict of interest and 
ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by two separate 
Supreme Court standards,87 they are intertwined to the extent 
that a finding of an actual conflict of interest will necessarily 
affect the ability of ail attorney to represent his client effectively.88 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim therefore merits serious 
scrutiny if the facts, as they did in Ojshe, also indicate an inherent 
conflict of interest. It is uncertain why the Eleventh Circuit 
cutors Invading the Attorney·Client Relationship? 71 A.B.A. J. 38. 38 (1985) (analyzing the 
implications of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 which "increased the 
government's power to seek forfeiture of attorney's fees and all other assets" received 
as payment by criminal defense attorneys). 
83. Ofshe. 817 F.2d at 1515. 
84. Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668. 698 (1984) (quoting Cuyler. 446 U.S. at 
342). 
85. Because the Strickland and Morrison tests require demonstrable prejudice. any 
claim by Of she utilizing either test alone would probably have failed. In the instant case. 
although Glass' representation of Of she was poisoned throughout. it would be difficult to 
isolate one tangible action that the court could readily identify as demonstrating actual 
prejudice. 
86. Courts had recognized this constitutional premise prior to Cuyler. As the Ninth 
Circuit noted: "Unlike competency of representation. where an attorney's conduct may 
fall anywhere along a continuum ranging from the incompetent to the superlative. conflict· 
laden representation is not susceptible of such fine gradations. Such representation is 
invidious. often escaping detection on review. and is tantamount to a denial of counsel 
itself." United States v. Mouzin. 785 F.2d 682. 703 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States 
v. Alvarez. 580 F.2d 1251. 1256-57 (5th Cir. 1978)). 
87. See supra notes 34 & 73 and accompanying text. 
88. The converse does not necessarily hold true. An ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim does not always turn upon whether a conflict of interest existed. It is when an 
actual conflict of interest results in a continuing adverse impact on the defense that such 
claim exacts thorough examination by the court. 
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ignored this analysis. The conflict of interest issue appears to 
represent Of she's strongest challenge.89 Of she's Petition for 
Certiorari emphasized the constitutional concerns raised by the 
appellate court's dismissal of the claim that Glass' conflict of 
interest had a chilling effect on Of she's defense.90 As stated in 
the court's opinion, Glass' actions were tainted with self-interest 
and deceit almost from the inception of his representation of 
Ofshe.91 
Obviously, any delay on Glass' part in bringing Ofshe's case to 
trial correlated to the possibility of delaying his own imminent 
criminal indictment. Glass had local counsel, Black, file numerous 
motions for continuance and instructed his client, Of she, to execute 
waivers of his right to a speedy tria1.92 Glass' actions had the 
effect of delaying Of she's case considerably. 
Because of this delay, Of she's case reached trial after the 
Supreme Court created an entirely new exception for search and 
seizure cases.93 Arguably, Of she would have had a reasonable 
probability of prevailing on his motion to suppress if his case 
had been decided earlier .94 
Of she's local counsel, Black, contended that the facts of Of she 
uniquely demonstrate how a client's interests can be prejudiced 
89. See O./she, 817 F.2d at 1515-16. 
90. Petition for Certiorari at 11, United States v. Of she, 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir.) (No. 
87-407), cert. dRnied, 108 S. Ct. 451 (1987): 
/d. 
The Court of Appeals glossed over the major issue in the case-it does not 
matter what prejudice the defendant could prove. The error was fundamental 
and of far greater import than the incarceration of one defendant. No client 
should ever have to fear that his own lawyer intends to harm him for that 
lawyer's own personal gain. 
91. Of she, 817 F.2d at 1511. 
92. !d. 
93. In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Court set forth a "good faith 
exception" to the exclusionary rule governing unconstitutional searches and seizures. 
Prior to Leon, the evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search conducted pursuant to 
a facially valid warrant was subject to exclusion. Subsequent to Leon, evidence obtained 
under a constitutionally deficient warrant is not excluded provided the officer acted in 
good faith in execution of a facially valid warrant. 
According to Ofshe's local counsel, Melvin Black, the Leon holding adversely affected 
Of she because it "gutted the motion to suppress," and caused Of she's case to conclude 
differently than it would have had his case gone to trial in a timely manner. Berg, supra 
note 3, at 2, col. 3. 
94. Of she's strongest fourth amendment contentions, that the search warrant was 
unconstitutional due to lack of probable cause and failure to describe the location to be 
searched with particularity, are rendered moot in the wake of Leon's good faith exception. 
See Berg, supra note 3, at 2, col. 3. 
15
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inherently by an actual conflict of interest on the part of his 
attorney.95 In his Writ of Certiorari, Of she contended that the 
court of appeals' failure to address the overwhelming evidence 
of a conflict of interest foreshadows a judicial breakdown of the 
sixth amendment right to counsel protections.96 When a client 
must question not only whether his attorney is acting in the 
client's best interests but, more egregiously, whether the attorney, 
with the government's aid and encouragement, is in fact 
"representing" his client for the purpose of advancing the 
attorney's best interests, the fundamental framework of protection 
upon which the sixth amendment right to counsel rests is 
completely undermined. 
II. FIFTH AMENDMENT ISSUES 
The fifth amendment provides in part that "[n]o person shall 
be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law."97 Of she's second contention on appeal was that "the 
government's conduct in invading the communications between 
him and Glass was so outrageous that it violated his Fifth 
Amendment due process rights."98 Although few Supreme Court 
decisions address the dismissal of a criminal conviction because 
of outrageous government conduct in violation of the fifth 
amendment, the Supreme Court discussed the issue in United 
States v. Russell.99 In Russell, the Court rejected the defense of 
entrapment stating that the case did not fall within the scope of 
95. Petition for Certiorari at 9, United States v. Of she, 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir.) (No. 
87-407), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 451 (1987) ("A defendant's attorney has a clearly defined 
and crucial role in the administration of justice, to-wit: to provide advocacy to the citizen 
accused in the adversary system of trial. That role is literally destroyed when the defense 
attorney becomes an agent of the prosecution."). 
[d. 
96. [d. 
Although the court of appeals indicated that it would not "condone" such 
conduct, it provided no remedy to deter future prosecutors from that conduct 
.... If prosecutors are free to use defense attorneys as informants against 
their clients, irreparable and fatal damage will be done to the delicate balance 
between the functions of the defense and the prosecution in making the 
criminal justice system work. 
97. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
98. OiSM, 817 F.2d at 1516. 
99. 411 U.S. 423 (1973). See also Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976) 
(defendant predisposed to committing crime of selling heroin could not claim that his fifth 
amendment due process rights were violated as a result of entrapment by government 
agents acting in concert with defendant!. 
16
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outrageous government conduct implicating due process 
principles.lOo However, the Court noted that future actions of 
"law enforcement agents" could conceivably constitute conduct 
which would fall within this context and "would absolutely bar 
the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a 
conviction."lIl1 Although the Russell Court recognized outrageous 
government conduct as a legal defense, the Court required the 
defendant to show that the challenged government conduct 
violated "that 'fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal 
sense of justice,' mandated by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment."lo2 Once a defendant has established that 
government action falls within the judicial definition of "outrageous 
conduct," this alone is sufficient to justify dismissal.103 
Of she contended that the government's conduct in his case did 
violate that "fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal 
sense of justice," articulated by the Supreme Court in Russell.104 
In rejecting Of she's claim, the Eleventh Circuit nevertheless 
stressed that its opinion was restricted solely to the facts before 
it and, further, that the court did not condone the government's 
conduct. !Os Additionally, the court refused Turow's demand to 
delete any reference to and subsequent recommendation regarding 
Turow's "reprehensible" behavior from its published opinion.106 
100. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973). The Court noted that the 
defendant's possible predisposition to unlawfully manufacture and sell methamphetamine 
seriously undercut his claim of entrapment. Id. at 432. 
101. !d. 
102. !d. at 432 (quoting Kinsella v. United States ex rei. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 
(1960)). 
103. !d. at 431-32. 
104. Of she, 817 F.2d at 1516. 
105. !d. The court went so far as to suggest that Glass' and Turow's behavior was so 
"reprehensible" as to merit further investigation, as evidenced by the court's inclusion 
in its opinion of the address, complete with zip code, of the Attorney Registration and 
Disciplinary Commission of illinois, implicitly directing the district judge to pursue the 
matter further. !d. at n.6. 
106. Appellee's Motion to Amend Panel Opinion, United States v. Of she, 817 F.2d 1508 
(11th Cir. 1987) (No. 86·5351). The court further expressed its concern that Turow's actions 
may have constituted an obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1982): 
In this case, the foreseeable result of Turow's conduct was that Glass' 
representation of Ofshe would be rendered ineffective. Indeed, Turow's own 
testimony reveals that he subjectively foresaw that very result .... 
In our opinion •.. Turow should have reasonably foreseen that the natural 
and probable consequence of the success of his scheme to monitor Of she's 
conversations with Glass would be to impede the due administration of 
justice in violation of section 1503. When a federal court becomes aware of 
conduct that may be criminal, it is duty bound to alert the appropriate 
17
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Arguably, a flaw in the court's reasoning is that it again 
circumvented the broader constitutional implications of Of she by 
limiting itself within its narrow analysis. Future fifth and sixth 
amendment violation claims may be endangered should the court 
of appeals' ruling be interpreted as upholding the government's 
conduct in actively encouraging defense attorneys to become 
informants against their own clients.Io7 Had the court focused on 
this issue, the government's activity might well have been held 
violative of due process if for no other reason than that the 
"dismissal of an indictment because of deliberate governmental 
misconduct [can be] used as a prophylactic tool for discouraging 
future actions of the same nature."IOS 
The Supreme Court generally recognizes that the due process 
clause limits government actions which violate a protected right 
of the defendanU09 Because the government's actions in Of she 
were characterized as "reprehensible"llo with no further 
elaboration, it is difficult to discern what fine gradation caused 
these same actions to fall short of outrageous conduct. The court 
of appeals appears content to premise its decision upon a summary 
finding that, despite the deplorable actions of the government, 
Of she suffered no prejudice.lll Curiously, the two Supreme Court 
authorities. 
ld. at 10, 12-13. But cf. Uviller, Presumed Guilty: The COUl·t of Appeals Versus Scott 
Turow, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1879 (1988), a thoughtful analysis focusing on the Eleventh 
Circuit's panel opinion censuring Turow and raising the spectre of his possible criminal 
behavior in the Ofshe case. Professor Uviller eventually concludes that Glass did labor 
"under an unethical conflict of interest," but takes issue with the court's proposition that 
Glass' "dereliction [should] be attributed to Turow." !d. at 1894. 
In further support of his analysis, Professor Uviller notes that Turow was acting "in 
accord with the policy of his office and the Department of Justice," the latter recently 
having "informed Mr. Turow that the matter would not be presented to a grand jury." 
ld. at 1901 n.64. The troubling question, of course, is whether such a departmental policy 
itself violates the sixth amendment right to counsel. 
107. This concern is raised and stated succinctly in Of she's Petition for Certiorari: "It 
is imperative that the sanction of dismissal be prescribed as the remedy to deter 
prosecutors from converting defense attorneys into informants against their own clients." 
Petition for Certiorari at 8, United States v. Of she, 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir.) (No. 87-407), 
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 457 (1987). 
108. United States v. Houghton, 554 F.2d 1219, 1224 (1st Cir. 1971). The government's 
continued recalcitrance in failing to divulge information about informants to defense 
counsel was held not to constitute outrageous conduct. Taken as a whole, the Court found 
the government acted with "due diligence." ld. at 1224-25. 
109. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976). Note, however, that the Court 
does not elaborate on what type or extent of a protected right must be violated before 
the limits of the due process clause come into play. 
110. Of she, 817 F.2d at 1516 n.6. 
111. ld. 
18
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 4
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol5/iss2/4
HeinOnline -- 5 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 637 1988-1989
1989] STRANGERS IN A STRANGE LAND 637 
cases articulating the due process defense of "outrageous 
government conduct" do not require a defendant to demonstrate 
prejudice; outrageous conduct alone is sufficient to justify 
dismissa1.1l2 In Ojshe, it would appear that the court of appeals 
did in fact find the government's conduct outrageous but not 
sufficiently outrageous to merit dismissal of the case against 
Of she. 
Courts have long recognized that the motivating force behind 
the due process clause is the promotion of fundamental fairness 
in government procedures.1l3 Thus, due process was intended to 
protect individuals from the very type of egregious government 
conduct suffered by Ofshe.ll4 Inherent in the court of appeals' 
disposition of O/she is this pivotal question: In the long run, does 
the court's decision promote or deter due process protections? 
There being nothing recondite about the court's analysis, the 
latter proposition would appear to be true. The constitutional 
precept of fundamental fairness in government procedures is 
strained to support an opinion such as O/she. 
CONCLUSION 
There are serious flaws in the O/she decision with respect to 
fifth and sixth amendment issues. Most significantly, the court's 
failure to consider Of she's claims under the Strickland and the 
Cuyler tests appears to leave wide gaps in the court's analysis. 
Of she met the first prong of the Strickland test. The court 
acknowledged that Glass' representation of Of she was ineffective. 
Yet, inexplicably, the court failed to reference the Strickland 
standard in its opinion. Although it is uncertain whether Of she 
could have proved that this ineffective representation prejudiced 
his defense, this was a pertinent issue which merited thorough 
discussion by the court. 
Additionally, the court's omission of any discussion of the 
Cuyla standard in its analysis of Glass' conflict of interest is 
112. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973); Hampron, 425 U.S. 484, 490. 
113. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) 
!Due process represents "a profound attitude of fairness between man and man, and more 
particularly between the individual and government."); Pedersen v. South Williamsport 
Area School Dist., 677 F.2d 312, 317 (3d Cir. 1982) ("Essentially, fundamental fairness is 
what due process means."); Gibbany v. Department of Corrections, 415 F. Supp. 1117, 
1121 (W.D. Okla. 1976) ("The touchstone of due process is fundamental fairness."). 
114. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942) ("Due process of law is secured against 
invasion by the federal Government by the Fifth Amendment and is safeguarded against 
state action in identical words by the Fourteenth."). 
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surprising. Whether the facts of Of she could ultimately support 
a valid conflict of interest claim is debatable. However, the court's 
recognition that Of she's attorney had such conflicting interests 
would appear to mandate application of Cuyler. 
In its analysis of both the fifth and sixth amendment claims, 
the court stressed repeatedly that its holding was limited to the 
unique facts of Ofshe. Ultimately, however, this rationale proves 
fatal to the court's opinion. 
The issue of concurrent attorney and government conduct in 
this case transcends the conviction of a single criminal defendant. 
This decision potentially will influence future actions by the 
government and by criminal defense counsel by defining broad 
parameters within which overzealous government officials and 
less-than-Ioyal defense attorneys may function. The precepts of 
the fifth and sixth amendments are too fundamental to our system 
of justice to be sacrificed to the type of "ends justifying means" 
mentality evidenced in Ofshe. 
A client's justified belief in his attorney's undivided loyalty 
should never be compromised by the actions of the government 
in converting that attorney into a government informant against 
his own client. The grave constitutional transgressions of the 
attorney and the government in Of she should mandate that these 
facts, as a matter of law, establish an actual conflict of interest 
giving rise to a per se presumption of prejudice, thus relieving 
the defendant of the burden of proving actual prejudice. Such a 
presumption is required when, as here, the combined actions of 
the government and the attorney produce a representation of a 
criminal defendant that is irreparably tainted with deceit, self-
interest and disloyalty. There can be no true representation 
within constitutional parameters by counsel in such circumstances. 
The charges against Of she should have been dismissed in order 
to salvage what dignity of the law is left in this particularly 
egregious situation. 
Cathy Bradl Peterson 
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